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1A city official shoots and kills the mayor and another public official, and, after 
claiming diminished capacity, is charged with voluntary manslaughter.
A policeman shoots and kills an unarmed ghetto youth and successfully 
pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. But the state can not comply with the court 
order to treat his medical illness-they can't find any mental illness.
A jealous husband shoots and kills baseball star Lymon Bostock, and in 
exchange for a hard luck story and a computer scored psychological test, is given four 
months of psychiatric treatment and freedom.* What these three stories have in 
common is that they illustrate some of the problems of the insanity defense. But 
perhaps the must publicized and talked about story conceruh.g the insanity defense 
happened nearly six years ago, and since that occurrence, the insanity defense has 
been at the forefront of public debate. In June of 1982, John Hinckley Jr., was 
acquitted of thirteen criminal counts stemming from his attempted assassination of 
President Ronald Reagan. This event had far-reaching ramifications for the insanity 
defense; not just because it was a crime against the President, but also because the 
American public had seen the event with their own eyes, countless times. They had 
seen John Hinckley commit the crime, now he was found not guilty. And the 
public's perception of the plea was quickly shown in an ABC poll taken on the day of 
the verdict. 76% of the American people did not feel that justice was done. 90% felt 
Hinckley should not be free if he recovered from the mental illness, but 75% felt 
sure that he would.^ There are many different forms of the insanity plea. It can be 
used in civil proceedings, in contract cases, and in divorce proceedings. But the issue
2is really only dealing with it in criminal matters, and more specifically using it as a 
way of escaping guilt for a crime that has been committed.
In this paper, I will first briefly discuss the evolution of the insanity plea, 
focusing on the different type of doctrirv s that have been advanced over the years. 
Secondly, I will look at Illinois as a case study to see the procedures and results of 
offering an insanity defense. And finally I will look at the different alternatives that 
have been offered, and use a policy evaluation method to try and determine the 
appropriate stance that should be taken in regard to the insanity defense.
I
The insanity defense has been with us, in some form or another, since biblical 
times. To believe in a defense for insanity, one must believe that "the criminal law 
exists to deter and to punish those who would, or who do choose to do wrong. If 
they can't exercise choice, they can't be deterred, and it's a moral outrage to punish 
t h e m . B u t  this has only been firmly established in law since 1843 and the famous 
English trial of Danial McNaughten. McNaughten attempted to assassinate the 
British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, but mistakenly shot and killed the Prime 
Minister's secretary, Edward Drummond. During the trial it was learned through 
the evidence that McNaughten was suffering from a disease that would now be 
classified as paranoid schizophrenia. And through the learnings of forensic 
psychiatrist Isaac Ray, the jury returned with a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity. Soon after the House of Lords established what has become known as the 
M'Naghten Rule or right-wrong test.4* It states that the defendant
3"can not be convicted if, at the time he committed the act, he was laboring, 
under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as to not know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, as not 
to know what he was doing was wrong."*
Through case law and statutes this test has been adopted by sixteen states.^ Of 
course, there has been numerous criticisms concerning the M’Naghten test that 
must be briefly discussed. The first criticism of M'Naghten is the terms that it 
employs are too ambiguous. The word know can be thought of as being too 
restrictive or too vague. Regardless of which, most jurisdictions do not define these 
term to jurors, leaving jurors to fend for themselves. Another word that has come 
under some criticism is the word wrong. The basis for this dilemma is whether 
wrong constitutes a legal or moral wrong, or both. In England it has been established 
that if a defendant knew an act was legally wrong, than he is guilty. But the U.S., at 
this time, has not decided whether a person can plead insanity if he knew it was 
legally wrong but morally right7
The most significant criticism of M'Naghten, and the one that I feel is the 
most important, is the question of volition versus cognition. M'Naghten takes into 
account the cognitive processes of thinking. That is, a person is judged insane if he 
can not clearly discern what is right or wrong, good or evil. Volition means action. 
M'Naughten ignores the impairment of volitional capacity, otherwise known as 
self-control. In a nutshell, a person is not considered insane by M'Naghten if the 
defendant knew his actions were wrong Hut were unable to control these actions.
For example, a schizophrenic with hallucinations forcing him to kill his wife, would
4not be judged legally insane. To combat this "problem" with the M'Naghten 
standard, many states supplemented M'Naghten with the irresistible impulse test.
In Virginia for example, irresistible impulse meant,"a moral or homicidal insanity 
which consists of an irresistible inclination to kill or commit some other offense...in 
situations where the accused is able to understand the nature and consequences of 
his act and knows it to be wrong, his mind has become so impaired by disease that he 
is totally deprived of his mental power to control or restrain the act."® In the 1886 
case of Parsons Vs. Alabama(1886), the court decided that it was constitutional to 
supplement M'Naghten with the irresistible impulse test and at the present time 
four states have this broadened M'Naghten rule.^
As psychiatry became a modern day science, many people felt that M'Naghten 
was too restrictive. That judging a person solely on the criteria of right or wrong was 
not nearly enough in determining insanity. "The recognition that one’s exercise of 
free will and moral responsibility, required for criminal liability, could be 
undermined by a wide range of mental disturbances beyond cognitive and volitional 
defects led, at least partially, to the adoption of the product test."^ In 1871, New 
Hampshire was the first state to reject M'Naghten and it took 73 years for New 
Hampshire's product rule to be clearly enunciated. Judge David Bazelon, in the case 
of Durham Vs. U.S.(1954), announced that "an accused is not criminally responsible 
if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or defect."^ * This wide, 
far-reaching standard became known as the Durham rule. Obviously there were 
problems with this liberal test. As with M'Naghten, the ambiguity of the words
5were one criticism. In Durham’s case the word product was debated, and as usual 
was never defined for the jurors, prosecutors went on to argue that while 
occasionally one can say that an act was a product of a mental disease, one can rarely, 
if ever say, that an act was not a product.^ But an even bigger problem with 
Durham is that it gave psychiatrists greater leeway to give all relevantfwhat 
psychiatrists considered relevant) information concerning the character of the 
defendant. This left the jury without any instructions and entirely dependent on 
the expert testimony. As one critic put it, "Durham rested upon the assumption that 
the concern is simply with mental disorder rather then the question of when the 
disorder should be accorded the specific legal consequence of a defense to criminal 
conviction,"13 In Macdonald Vs. U.S.0967) the court tried to define Durham by 
stating that a mental disease or defect may differ for clinical and legal purposes and 
they also gave a working definition of mental disease or defect.^ At this time only 
one state, New Hampshire, abides by the principle of Durham. It is also ironic that 
Judge David Bazelon was the first to repudiate it in U.S. Vs. Brawner(1972), and later 
endorsed the American Law Institutes standard (ALI).l®
The ALI's Modern Penal Code Standard has been characterized as a somewhat 
modernized combination of M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse test, has been 
adopted in twenty-four states, the District of Columbia, and in all of the Federal 
circuits. The ALI test states:
(1)"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity,
either to appreciate criminality(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law.
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(2) As used in this article, the terms "mental disease or defect" does not 
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise 
anti-social conduct."^ It should be
noted that most of the twenty-four states that use this test make some minor 
modifications. For example, omission of the second paragraph, deletion of the word 
substantial, and favoring either the word criminality or wrongfulness in this 
context.*' Again there has been criticism of the forementioned rule. One is the 
ambiguity of the word substantial, which of course is left to the jurors interpretation 
of that word during deliberation. After this test was adopted by virtually all of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals Judges, it was quickly repudiated by Congress in 1984, in favor 
of a more restrictive M'Naughten style statutory formula.1° This, of course, was a 
backlash to the John Hinckley incident that so troubled the public. As can be seen, 
each state has a different preconceived notion as to what constitutes a person being 
found criminally insane. I will defer discussion of states that have abolished the 
plea or have radically changed it, until the discussion of possible alternatives.
The intricacies of the plea must also be discussed. And the first question is 
that of burden of proof. Criminal law generally presumes that a defendant is sane 
unless the defendant raises the issue of insanity. Under federal law the prosecution 
must bear the burden of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
However in Davis Vs. U.S.(1895), the Supreme Court stated that this allocation of
7burden of proof is not binding on the states.^ The states differ on this issue,with 
seventeen states following the federal government’s lead and thirty-two others 
requiring the defendant to prove his insanity through a preponderance of the 
evidence.^ The burden of proof has, of late, become a hotly contested issue. This, 
perhaps, came about after the Hinckley Trial, when a number of jurors felt that they 
were forced to acquit Hinckley because the burden was not and could not be reached 
by the prosecution. All it seems to take is one credible psychiatrist, with a 
psychological test, and doubt will sufficiently be raised in the mind of the jurors.^
The debate about the scope of expert testimony in an insanity defense strikes at 
the very heart of the problem. That being whether psychiatrists or mental health 
experts are able to accurately assess a person's mental state. Thomas Szasz, a noted 
psychiatrist, has repeatedly argued that there really is no such thing as mental 
illness, per se.^2 Psychiatry, one must remember, is a very theoretical science. 
Psychiatrists can describe behavior and ofter explanations, but that is all. Regardless 
of the ability of the psychiatrist to accurately assess a defendant, an expert opinion is 
usually prohibited from giving his or her opinion on the applicable law. However 
psychiatrists will usually paraphrase to get around this. For example, a psychiatrist, 
instead of concluding his remarks with the statement that the defendant was insane, 
might say that the defendant failed to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her 
behavior at the time of the crime.^
The final aspect to look at is the disposition of insanity acquitees. This section,
I feel, is at the brunt of the defense’s problem-at least in the public's view. In my
8opinion, there would be no debate on the subject if people acquitted by the insanity 
defense were kept off the public streets or were cured. The prototype case of a man 
serving only four months in a hospital for a murder, or of someone being let out of 
a hospital seemingly cured, only to go out on a killing spree, are at the base of the 
American public's fears about the insanity defense. There seems to be three different 
options for dealing with defendants acquitted by the not guilty by reason of insanity 
charge. These options can be place along a continuum, with the least restrictive 
option on one end and the most restrictive disposition on the other end. Under the 
least restrictive approach, which nineteen states currently subscribe to, the state must 
prove with clear and convincing evidence in a separate civil commitment 
proceeding, that the acquitee meets the general civil commitment criteria, which 
basically means dangerous.^ The next solution along the continuum is mandatory 
commitment to a mental institution for the purpose of psychological evaluation.
This period is usually around thirty days. After that time,a civil hearing is held, if 
the hospital finds the former defendant to be a subject for civil commitment. The 
third and most restrictive plan is advocated by twelve states and also has a 
mandatory commitment period. But this period is not for the purpose of 
evaluation, but instead constitutes a criminal commitment/* Some states limit the 
confinement period to the maximum criminal sentence that could have been 
sanctioned if the acquitee was found guilty. The District of Columbia offers another 
optic wherein the defendant must prove his sanity by a preponderance of the 
evidence at a hearing that is held every six months."* In the recent landmark case of
9Jones Vs. U.S.(1983), the Supreme Court stated that it was also constitutional to hold 
a acquittee in a hospital longer than the maximum criminal sentence that would be 
allowed/'
There have been a number of empirical studies done on the length of time 
one spends in the hospital, what type of people are usually committed etc., and I feel 
a brief overview is in order. Richard Pasework did a study that was published irt the 
"Journal of Psychiatry and Law," and found that generally people are 
institutionalized for a significantly lesser period of time then if they would have 
been found guilty. '® He also found that the length of hospitalization is directly 
related to the sevetity of the crime: murderers 32.9 months, rapists 21.2 months, and 
assault 11.1 months/* Educated, female, and married people all served less time. 
Also Pasework found that in a study of twenty-nine patients who committed 
murder, the activity of their counsel had a dramatic effect on the dates of their 
releases. Thirteen had active counsel and eleven were subsequently discharged; 
while the other sixteen did not have active legal counsel and only one was 
discharged/® Finally, Pasework, in a New York study, followed eighty-eight 
discharged males and found that twenty-one were rearrested, seven with the same 
offense and 25% of the arrests were crimes against the personfmurder, assault, 
rape)/* Although this is one study, and I do not mean to overgeneralize, there 
seems to be numerous problems with these results and consequently with problems 
In our mental health system. The problem seems to signify the ignorance of the 
psychological profession concerning the matter of curing mentally ill patients. The
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main purpose for hospitalization,instead of prison, is to rehabilitate or cure the 
offender. What these results show is that psychiatrists and officials seem to have 
know way of knowing whether someone is cured of their .’llness or not. For 
instance, Pasework shows that an active attorney has a far greater chance of securing 
release than a non-active attorney. It would be ridiculous for us to assume that 
active attorneys cause patients to be cured expediently. Another factor to look at is 
the more serious a crime, the greater length of stay for that patient in the hospital. 
This means that the more violent a crime, the more mentally deranged a patient is. 
This, of course, is untrue. What the hospitals are intentionally or unintentionally 
doing is providing a punitive type of treatment to the patient; ironically, doing 
exactly the opposite of what hospitals were intended to accomplish. Most 
importantly, there is a chance of a person getting released and going out and 
committing crimes. The number is nowhere near the public': perception of 
recurrent crime, but the problem is there. As noted lawyer William Winslade says, 
the percentage of cases of rearrested patients may be small, but there still is a 
significant number that has to be dealt with and solved.** it should be noted that 
this problem is not solely the problem of the hospitals. Jails also experience many 
repeat felons after they had been released through parole.
Before I go on to Illinois law, I feel I should briefly explain the law dealing 
with the question of incompetence to stand trial. This question is much more 
prevalent than the insanity plea with there being forty-five incompetency pleas for 
every one insanity plea.^ The law states that if a person is unable to understand the
proceedings of a trial then he will not be tried. A defendant who is found 
incompetent will have his trial delayed until he is seen as fit. In Dusky Vs. 
U.S.(1960),the Supreme Court said that a defendant is competent if he has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding and with a reasonable degree of rational understanding about the 
proceedings.^ This means that if a person is using an insanity defense during the 
trial he is presumed to be able to fully understand the events and occurrences before 
him. The incompetency issue, however, can be raised at any time during the 
criminal process. But it is most often raised during the arraignment proceeding.^* 
As I mentioned, if a defendant is found to be incompetent he is than placed Into a 
hospital until he is perceived fit to understand the court proceedings. There is a 
good chance, however, that there will not be a trial when the defendant has 
recovered. For one, most of the witnesses may not be around to testify, or if they are 
present, many may have forgotten what actually occurred. The prosecution now 
must also show that there is a valid purpose for continuing the criminal 
proceedings. If a defendant had spent fifteen years in a hospital there may be no 
reason for the prosecution starting the proceedings again.
II
"Most importantly (the verdict) is designed to protect the public from violence 
inflicted by persons with mental ailments who slipped through the cracks of the 
criminal justice system." This quote was from Illinois Governor James Thompson 
introducing the guilty but mentally ill plea to the Illinois Assembly.^ The law
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entitled 111. Rev. Stat. ch.38 6-2(c)(1981) significantly altered the insanity defense in 
Illinois.^? It should be noted, however, that the guilty but mentally ill plea is not 
the sole criterion in determining insanity. Juries now have four possible verdicts 
from which to choose: guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, and guilty 
but mentally ill. Guilty but mentally ill basically provides the jurors the opportunity 
to find a defendant guilty, yet acknowledge his or her mental illness and need for 
treatment. The major intent of the guilty but mentally ill legislation is to help 
prosecutors convict defendants who would otherwise have been acquitted by reason 
of insanity. What is happening is that "while the guilty but mentally plea and 
verdict supplements rather than supplants the insanity defense, in the states that 
have enacted guilty but mentally ill legislation, it is often seen as having supplanted 
it in practice.^ The defendant, if convicted by a guilty but mentally ill plea, is than 
sentenced as if he was not insane. But before serving time is examined by state 
appointed psychiatrists who will transfer, if they see fit, the defendant to a mental 
health facility. At that point he may be held at the hospital only until his sentence 
runs out. If he is, supposedly, cured, than he must continue the remainder of his 
sentence in the state's correctional institutions. Michigan was the first state to 
establish this verdict in 1975 and it has basically served as the prototype for 
lllinois(1981) and eleven other states who have adopted the guilty but mentally ill 
plea.39
Illinois does also subscribe to the not guilty by reason of insanity plea. Illinois, 
like most other states, use the definition of insanity advocated by the ALI. in their
model penal code(with a few minor changes). This was made into law in 1975, Rev. 
Slat. Ch. 38 6-2(a).^ According to this statute, a defendant must be proven insane by 
showing that the defendant "lacks substantial capacity, either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law as a 
result of a mental disorder or defect."^ If the jury does not feel that the defendant 
fits that definition of insanity, they may also consider the guilty but mentally ill plea. 
Whereas the not guilty by reason of insanity plea refers to a person as insane, the 
guilty but mentally ill plea uses the term mental illness. Mental illness is defined as 
a "substantial disorder of thought or mood, a behavior which afflicted a person at 
the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person’s 
judgement, but not to the extent that he or she is unable to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her behavior, or is unable to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law."42 if the jury finds that the defendant is not insane, but is 
suffering from a mental illness, then the guilty but mentally ill plea should be 
enforced.
One major difference between the legal terms mental illness and insanity is 
that insanity can be found on the basis of a volitional impairment ("conform 
conduct to the requirements of the law"), however there is no volitional test in the 
mental illness definition. When the defendant has asserted his right to the insanity 
defense, and the judge feels it is warranted by the evidence, the jury will then be 
provided with a special guilty but mentally ill verdict form which requires finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act charged, and was
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not legally insane at the time of the act.43 If the defendant is charged guilty but 
mentally ill, the Illinois Department of Corrections will conduct hearings into the 
defendant's psychological state, and through these results may decide to transfer 
custody to the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental 
Disabilities.^ There he will serve out his sentence if he remains mentally ill, or, if 
cured, be transferred back to the Department of Corrections. This procedure has 
withstood various constitutional attacks on grounds including, equal protection 
(People Vs. Kaeding 1983), and procedural due process (People Vs. Dewitt 1984). The 
one constitutional entity that may cause a problem for the guilty but mentally ill 
plea is the fundamental fairness principle, which seems to be threatened by the 
confusion that has been initiated by these two competing standards.^
Ill
In this final section I will attempt to determine the best options concerning 
the insanity plea using Nagel's computer aided policy evaluation program.^ This 
program is designed to give the strongest option after scoring each option or 
alternative relative to a particular criteria or goal. In this section, I will discuss four 
different aspects of the insanity plea: defining insanity, burden of proof in the trial, 
disposition of an acquitted defendant, and burden of proof in the disposition stage.
In regard to defining insanity and the disposition of an acquitted defendant, I will 
make two computer files that will describe different alternatives and criteria for the 
two aspects. I will then score the different alternatives and decide on the best 
alternative. One problem with this program that I will try to avoid, is that of
subjectivity. When scoring particular items or putting different weights on criteria, 
there is inherently a problem with losing one s objectivity. However, throughout 
this section, I will try to inoculate any score or weight that has the slightest 
possibility of coming from the heart and not the mind.
The first file will be used to determine the test that should be used in defining 
insanity. One alternative, however, is to abolish the notion of insanity as a plea.
Call for abolishment comes from both sides of the political spectrum. Former 
President Richard Nixon once said, "Abolition of the insanity defense is the most 
significant feature of the administrations proposed criminal code. " ^  And noted 
liberal author and attorney Abraham Goldstein says," the insanity defense exists 
only to commit guilty, not to help them escape penal sanctions...The insanity 
defense is caught up in some of the most controversial ideological currents of our 
time. The direction it takes depends, essentially, upon the place in social control one 
assigns to the criminal law as it competes with other methods of regulation by the 
state, to each of the themes underlying the criminal law, to the confidence one has 
that the mentally ill offender can be identified and treated, and the importance one 
allocates to the idea of blame."^ There are numerous arguments for abolishing the 
plea, from Goldstein's socio-cultural explanation to the mere fact that it is a rich 
man's defense. Other arguments for abolishing the plea go straight to the heart of 
the issue. As psychiatrist Thomas Szasz wrote in his essay "The Myth of Mental 
Illness," there is no such thing as mental illness, and its only function is to disguise 
and thus render non-palatable the bitter pill of moral conflict in human relations.^
The fact of the matter is, we as a society, cannot accurately ascertain how 
sick(mentally) a person actually is. There is just no basis in psychiatry to make a 
differentiation between a man who is personally bla.'  worthy from the man who is 
not. This is why some criminals, John Hinckley are found insane, while others, 
equally as "mad,"(Charles Manson) are found sane and put in prisons. To say that 
John Hinckley is crazier than Charles Manson is insane in itself. As Norval Morris 
states, "what about the fact that no one of serious perception will fail to recognize 
both the extent of mental illness and retardation among the prison population."^ 
And noted psychiatrist and lawyer William Winslade states that psychiatry is 
inherently theoretical; it can describe behavior and offer explanations about 
behavior, but it can't determine the truth about the state of mind of a patient. He 
goes on to point out that the prosecution contends that the accused is a person acting 
as an independent decision maker; while the defense is arguing that the defendant is 
a victim of forces beyond his own control.^ Neither, however, can be empirically 
proved.
When one speaks of abolishing the insanity plea, proponents of the plea talk 
about moral standards and the question of responsibility. How could you convict 
someone who is not responsible for their actions? To counter the responsibility 
argument, proponents of abolishing the insanity defense mention the 1975 case of 
U.S.Vs. Park. This case had literally nothing to do with the insanity defense but it 
did establish strict liability in some work p laces.^  By that I mean, a person can be 
convicted regardless of innocence or care. Basically saying, in some instances,
someone can be found guilty when they are not fully responsible.
However most abolitionists agree that we can't have the same type of 
punishment for someone who "knowingly" committs a crime to someone who does 
not. In strict liability cases there is a mitigation of punishment and in insanity pleas 
there is the question of mens rea. According to Black's Law Dictionary mens rea 
means, "A guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent. Cuilty 
knowledge and willfulness.''”  The mens rea approach or mens rea limitation 
theory would limit the significence of mental impairment to the specific mental 
state, which is an element of the offense. At this time three states have abolished 
the insanity defense in favor of the mens rea approach: Montana, Idaho, and 
Utah.54 According to Montana state law, the defendant's mental condition is 
admissible to negate the state of mind or mens rea, required as an element of the 
crime in question. In order to convict a defendant who has brought forth evidence 
that he was mentally deranged at the time of the crime, prosecutors must prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did have the mental capacity, or mens 
rea, to form the evil intent which is material to every crime.”  For example, if 
Steve kills Bob, Steve can't escape conviction by pleading the insanity defense, 
claiming that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the 
offense. Steve may, however, attempt to demonstrate, by expert mental health 
testimony, that he was so severely ill at the time of the offense that he could not 
have knowingly, purposefully, or intentionally killed Bob (no mens rea). Possibly 
because he thought Bob was a demon. By the mens rea approach, Steve might
escape conviction if the prosecution fails to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, his 
intent to murder, i.e., prove the physical act and prove a guilty mind. As in most 
states, *he laws also permit evidence of mental disorder to be raised at the time of 
sentencing as a mitigating factor.
Another option is that of diminished capacity, which was tried in California, 
and then quickly overturned. The Butler Committee recommended abolishing the 
insanity defense and adopt a rule of diminished capacity, which states that evidence 
of abnormal mental condition would be admissible to affect the degree of the crime 
for which the accused could be convicted.^ For example, the charge of murder in 
the first degree may be reduced to second degree upon showing that the defendant 
lacked the capacity to premeditate.
The abolitionist position can be summed up by professor Norval Morris. "It is 
unthinkable that mental illness should be given a lesser reach than drunkenness. If 
a given mental conditiondntent, recklessness) is required for the conviction of a 
criminal offense...in the absence of that mental condition there can be no conviction. 
This holds true whether the absence of that condition is attributable to blindness, 
deafness, drunkenness, mental illness, or retardation etc... But this states basic 
principle of criminal law-not a special defense."^'
Other than the obvious moral dilemma that would be presented if the plea 
was abolished, other pertinent questions arise about the effectiveness of the mens 
rea approach. James Wickham, an attorney with the Idaho Attorney General's 
Office, asserted that the Idaho Legislature "did not abrogate the common law
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principle that the severely mentally ill are not responsible for otherwise criminal 
conduct. Indeed it broadened the cases in which the defendants will be acquitted, the 
experts who may testify, and conferred broad discretion to trial judges to formulate 
jury instructions on the questions."^ The mens rea approach does seem to have 
the same sorts of problems as the insanity defense itself. The ambiguity of the words 
intent, negligence, and reckless are comparable to wrongfulness or substantial 
capacity. Will the mens rea approach be used more in regard to lesser offenses then 
the plea is used? Could this spur an increase in expert psychiatric testimony? No 
one is sure. Finally, one must remember that by abolishing the defense, it does not 
mean that psychologically ill patients are put in jail. It only means that there is a 
different course to the mental hospital.
The first file is to determine the test that should be used in defining insanity. 
Throughout common law history there have been mainly four alternatives that 
have predominated the field and I have discussed them in the previous pages: 
M'Naghten, Durham, AL1, and abolition or mens rea. Briefly, M'Naghten advocates 
the principle of right vs. wrong, and for this study 1 will not use the irresistible 
impulse test as a tag to the M'Naghten rule. Durham states that a defendant is not 
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was a product of a mental disease or defect. 
And suffice it to say that the AL1 approach is a synthesis of Durham and M'Naghten, 
with the irresistible impulse test added on. The last alternative is that of abolishing 
the defense and using the mens rea approach. Differentiating between the 
M'Naghten rule and AL1 is difficult, but the ALI standard is noteworthy,"in its use
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of the word appreciate instead of the cognitive understanding suggested by the use of 
the word know in the M'Naghten rule; in its requirement that an insane defendant 
lack'substantial capacity' thereby withdrawing from the seemingly more stringent 
requirement of the M'Naghten rule for a total lack of capacity to distinguish right 
from wrong; and finally, in its incorporation of an independent volitional or 
'irresistible impulse' component into the standard of insanity by the requirement 
that an insane person lack substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the la w .""
There are seven criteria used in this particular file. The first criteria is that of 
the morality of the problem(moral). By this I mean which alternative would 
inherently do the best job of separating the innocent from the guilty. Which 
alternative would keep those defendants not responsible for their actions out of jail 
and not labeled as guilty. The second criteria is the public's perception criteria. I feel 
it is important for the law to be conducive to the public's wishes and I feel it's also 
important to look at what the commoner feels the best approach would be to u 
particular problem. Predictability is the third criteria and this looks at which 
alternative would be the easiest for jurors to comprehend and therefore most easily 
help society determine how a defendant will be charged. There are two goals that I 
label as feasibility. The first is political feasibility and that means the criterion that 
discusses how likely the law or statute could be changed, and if it is seen as 
constitutionally feasible. Legal feasibility is basically how the alternatives will effect 
the system. For example, does the alternative inherently add more expert testimony
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to the proceedings. The last two goals are symbolic. The conservative symbol 
advocates the notion of retribution. Basically saying, we can't forget the fact that the 
defendant, whether insane or not, committed a crime. And if one committs a crime, 
they should be punished. On the other hand, the liberal symbol advocates 
individual rights and the notion of responsibility. A liberal points out that a person 
should not be punished if he is not aware of a crime being committed.
Since there are four alternatives, I will score each criterion on a 1*4 scale, with 
4 being the best alternative for that particular goal. Looking at the first goal (moral), 
it is obvious that abolishing the insanity plea would put the label of guilt on many 
people who are not responsible, and if not responsible, than perhaps innocent. This 
is not to say that the defendants will only be put in prisons and not hospitals, but it is 
to say the defendants will be labeled as guilty. The Durham test is the most broadly 
construed test for insanity. But I do not believe that this implies Durham would be 
able to separate the guilty from the irresponsible. I feel Durham would advocate 
using the plea more, and perhaps be used to let guilty people off on the plea. So 
while it would separate some irresponsible defendants from responsible defendants, 
it would also let guilty defendants use the insanity plea as an escape to the hospital 
instead of prison. Differentiating the last two alternatives on this particular criteria 
is difficult. The chief difference being the AL1 uses a volitional test and that 
M'Naghten is significantly more restrictive. I am of the belief that if there is such a 
thing as being not responsible for a crime, then it logically follows that there are 
particular cases in which a person should not be held responsible if he can not
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control his actionsfvolitional test). How could a person be found guilty if he had no 
control of his actions? The question of whether volition can be proved or 
disproved, and the question of whether there is such a circumstance need not be 
discussed here, as it is not applicable to this particular goal. Therefore, the modem 
penal code would find a defendant with a volitional problem innocent and thereby 
be able to separate an "innocent" offender more often than the M'Naghten principle.
The second criteria is the public's perception of the rule. As we now know 
most people do not truly understand the rules in their particular state. Some 
misperceptions are that the plea is used all the time, it is easy to be found innocent, 
and rarely, if ever, do the hospitals rehabilitate. The public seems to feel that the 
plea does not do a good enough job of separating the innocent from the guilty; who 
are just using this exception in our legal system to escape a criminal sentence. As I 
have shown, the modem penal code does the best job of separating the innocent, but 
this is not applicable to this criteria because the public does not view it as such. And 
while the public feels there should be some sort of test for insane people, they feel it 
should not be as broad as it is at the present moment. The strictest alternative is the 
M'Naghten alternative, and while many people do not know what this entails, it 
can be explained easily through the right-wrong test. Also it is rarely used at the 
present time, and by implementing this in the majority of states, the public may 
view it as a conservative step in the right direction. Implementing Durham would 
be the worst thing for the public because the public's hope is for restricting the test 
not broadening it. And the call for abolishing the plea, even at the time of the
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Hinckey acquittal, was at a minimum, and has since subsided/’  ^ Thus, i feel the Al.l 
test would score higher than abolishing the plea in this particular criteria.
Predictability is the third criteria, and I feel abolishing the plea is the strongest 
alternative for this goal. First of all, jurors will not have the problem of deciphering 
ambiguous terms, and while there still may be expert testimony, it will be limited. 
Abolishing the plea will also help attorneys and the public better know the possible 
outcomes of going to trial. The M'Naghten test would be the next best option 
considering it is the least ambiguous of the alternatives, and that it also restricts 
testimony to the question of right or wrong, nothing else. Durham, as it is used, is 
the alternative that advocates the most expert testimony and also has a far-reaching 
definition. This rule leaves the jury to fend for themselves.
Political feasibility is the criteria looking at the constitutional feasibility of the 
alternatives. And since the ALI standard is established in the majority of the states, 
and is the basic guideline for the federal law, it becomes obvious that this alternative 
is by far and wide the best. However, as 1 previously mentioned, the federal 
government has shifted its emphasis toward the M'Naghten rule and this has not 
suffered any constitutional defeat. The most important alternative to look at in this 
particular section is abolishing the plea. The question of the constitutionality of this 
particular plea has been questioned but not really answered. For instance, In the ease 
of In Re Winship(1970), the court basically states that abolishing the plea would not 
be contrary to to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.^ Given the 
state supreme court rulings in State Vs. StrasbourgfWashington 1910), Sinclair Vs.
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State(Mississippi 1931), and State Vs. Lange(Louisiana 1929), it appears unlikely that 
provisions that completely disallow the issue of mental disturbance to be raised 
during a criminal trial would overcome constitutional objections. Of course the 
mens rea approach does allow testimony concerning mental disturbances. The only 
pertinent constitutional objection that has not, at this time, been tested is the theory 
of fundamental fairness.^ However, of all the alternatives, the mens rea 
approach(abolition alternative) would definitely be the most difficult to pass into 
law. It would radically change the legal system and both conservative and liberals 
alike would have a hard time dealing with that event. The goal of legal feasibility 
seems to center on the question of to what extent these definitions will effect export 
testimony in the trial proceedings. Abolition of the defense will curtail expert 
testimony to only the question of the state of mind of the individual And as with 
the predictability criteria, Durham would imply by its language the use of many 
experts, testifying on many different respects. And while M'Naghten and the AL1 
are basically equal in this respect, I will give a slight edge to M’Naghten, only because 
experts are not needed to discern any volitional requirements.
The first symbolic criteria is a conservative one. And even though I have 
previously discussed that abolishing the plea may not seriously curtail using 
insanity as a defense per so., and also that abolishing the plea does not mean a 
defendant will not go to a hospital and subsequently be let out, abolishing is still the 
strongest alternative for the conservative symbol. By saying one cannot use insanity 
as a total defense, the public is being told that if a crime is committed, a defendant
must face up to the crime. It is fairly easy to see that the remaining three 
alternatives run on a continuum from most restrictive to least, or M'Naghten to 
ALI to Durham. With the test that is most difficult to prove insanity, M'Naghten, 
being seen as the most conservative of the three alternatives.
The second symbol is the liberal symbol. This symbol basically views that a 
defendant must be responsible to be held accountable for a crime. Therefore, 
everything must be done to insure that a defendant has knowledge and forethought 
of a crime to be punished. The liberal views the insanity defense as necessary to 
keep the moral fiber of our legal system and of our country as strong as possible. 
Needless to say, abolishing the plea outright is usually the last thought on a liberal's 
mind, Szasz and Goldstein are exceptions to this rule. And although the Durham 
rule is the most broadly construed test, I feel liberals are against it because of the fact 
that it really does not work and thus only strengthens the opposition. In time the 
Durham or product test proved to be almost too liberal or radical, and was 
repudiated by the same man who initiated it. The ALI, because it is more broadly 
construed than M’Naghten and uses the volitional test, is definitely the preferred 
choice among liberals.
Moral Public p. Predict Fwis. P Feas. L. (Ton. Lib.
ALI 4 3 2 4 2 2 4
M'Naghten 3 4 3 3 3 3 3
Durham 2 1 1 2 1 1 2
Abolition 1 2 4 1 4 4 1
weight-1 
TOTAL 
AL1 21 
M'NAGHTEN 22 
DURHAM 10 
ABOLITION 17
At this point it looks as if M'Naghten would be the strongest alternative. But 
it would be naive for us to assume that each goal would be of equal importance for 
the alternatives. Since there are six different goals, 1 will increase the weight of the 
criteria on a 1-6 scale. 1 will attempt to describe my reasons for the different weights 
on the criteria, but this section is increasingly subjective. Tire seventh criteria of 
legal feasibility seems to be, far and wide, the least important of the criteria. The 
functioning of the court can change through a variety of means, and one mean does 
not have to be the insanity plea. If the amount of expert testimony is viewed as a 
problem, the definition of insanity will not directly offer a solution to the problem.
I
With that in mind, 1 decided to eliminate that criteria. The strongest goal in this 
section is the moral criteria. And the reason I feel it is the strongest is that at the 
defining part of the trial proceeding, the most important issue is determining a 
man's sanity or insanity, whether he is responsible or irresponsible for his actions. 
The other tangible aspects, including punishment, is not relevant at this time. We
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must be able to determine which alternative will best accurately ascertain a sane 
defendant from an insane defendant. If this fails, the whole process fails.
Another important aspect of these alternatives is predictability. Again, like 
the moral criteria, this lies at the very core of the problem and is an important 
criteria to accurately judge the best alternative. This goal is important because to 
understand a rule is imperative to be able to use it correctly and fairly. Usually it 
would be important for the two symbols to have equal weights as to not totally 
alienate the other branch. But in this particular file I must differ with the standard 
approach. The reason is simple. While there is an indirect relationship with the 
defining law and the conservative symbol of retribution and punishment, it is not a 
very strong factor at this time. Regardless of the alternatives, the punishment can be 
severe or weak and therefore it is really not necessary to worry about punishment at 
this time. On the other hand, the liberal symbol of responsibility is much more 
important at this juncture. For the primary reason that this plea is used to make 
sure that people not responsible for their actions not be punished.
The final two criteria, 1 feel are not overly important. Political feasibility has 
never struck me as a very important goal. Obviously, if something is blatantly 
unconstitutional or impossible to pass into law, then this criteria becomes 
imperative to look at. But the four alternatives have all been established into law 
and have been upheld on constitutional grounds. It is true that some alternatives 
are constitutionally stronger than the next, but 1 still fail to believe that this is a very 
important issue concerning these alternatives. The public perception goal I usually
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feel is a very important criteria. But in this particular circumstance, 1 do not feel it is 
a very important aspect. As 1 have mentioned lx fore, the public has many 
misperceptions about the plea. Most of these misperceptions deal with the 
disposition of the defendant. The definition of insanity is not what concerns the 
public. Also the differences between the definitions may be too difficult for the 
layman to understand, or even really care. With these thoughts in mind, I changed 
the weights of the criteria accordingly:
MORAL=6x FEAS.P=3x
PREDICT=5x CONS.»2x
LIBERAL=4x PUB.P=lx
The revised primary analysis looks quite a bit different than the first scoring
chart:
ALI59 
M'NACHTEN 54 
DURHAM 54 
ABOLITION 43
As can be seen by comparing the two scores, A LI comes out the winner with 
the weighted scores and the Durham test moves up to tie M'Naghten. Abolishing 
the plea has now come in third in the first primary analysis and last on the second 
analysis, and therefore, does not seem to be the appropriate answer. It is apparent 
that M'Naghten and ALI are the two strongest alternatives and thereby warrant 
further discussion.
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The next step is to see what it would take for M'Naghten to become the 
highest rated alternative under the weighted criteria. For that we look at the 
threshold analysis of the two alternatives.
CRITERIA: M’NAGHTEN ALI WEIGHT
MORAL 2.83 2.17 1.0
PUB.P 9.0 -2.0 6.0
LIBERAL 3.25 1.75 -1.0
CONS. 5.50 -.5 7.0
FEAS.P 4.67 2.33 -2.0
PREDICT 4.00 1.0 10.0
Analyzing the threshold analysis, the first thing I notice is the weight category. 
Since I assigned weight from scores of 1-6, any number out of that range would not 
be feasible to change. For instance, giving the predict criteria a weight of 10 or the 
conservative symbol a weight of 7 is definitely assigning too strong a weight for that 
criteria or any criteria for that matter. The only two goals that fall into the 1-6 scale 
are the moral criterion and the public perception criterion. It is interesting to note 
that both the moral and the public perception criteria fall on my extremes for the 
weight category, with moral having a weight of six and public perception having a 
weight of one. For M'Naghten to pull ahead, the extremes must be totally reversed.
A change of weight of one or two may be appropriate, but to reverse the weights in
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not feasible.
The scoring section of the threshold analysis offers more hope for the 
M'Naghten alternative. Like the weight section, I specifically scored the criteria on a 
particular scale, 1-4. Therefore anything out of that range would not be practical to 
look at. Public perception and the conservative symbol are the only two criteria that 
do not need to be dealt with under the threshold analysis. If one looks closely at the 
scores, it can be seen that the liberal criteria and the political feasibility criteria both 
need changes of two points to have M'Naghten come out ahead. For example, the 
liberal score for M'Naghten was a 2, and through the threshold analysis, a score of 
3.25 is needed, a change of 1.25. The ALI score was a 3, and according to the 
threshold analysis, it must also change by a score of 1.25. In the political feasibility 
category the score must change by 1.5 to have a new winner. These changes, I feel, 
are a little too severe to warrant serious thought. However the moral and 
predictability categories are a different story. In the moral category, the change of 
scores is less than a point to make M'Naghten a winner, either M'Naghten going 
from2-2.83 or ALI shifting from a 3 to a 2.17. Looking back at the moral criteria, 
however, I do not feel that a change is warranted. It is clear that ALI is a broader 
standard, and by that it can be easily inferred that more people will be found insane. 
Does this mean there is a better chance of separating innocent people from guilty 
people ? No! But we can never know, and at least ALI will give more people the 
opportunity to prove their innocence than the M'Naghten standard would. The 
criteria labeled predictability would change the winner if M'Naghten moved from a
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3 to a 4. Looking back at the scoring, we can see that the abolition alternative scored 
a 4, so is it feasible to change these scores? There are experts who feel that abolishing 
the plea will cause more problems than it is worth. As I have previously 
mentioned, the mens rea principle is difficult to comprehend. Also, expert 
testimony will still be u 1, and instead of trying to figure out if the defendant knew 
his act was right or wrong, the jury would instead have to figure out the state of 
mind of the individual. Both of these options can be very confusing.
In conclusion, I will stick to the primary analysis that says ALI is the best 
option. However, as can be seen in the threshold analysis, especially with regards to 
the predictability criteria, the spot at the front is not very secure to say the least. 
While ALI is the strongest, a state would not go terribly wrong by using the 
M'Naghten alternative.
The next file deals with the question of disposition. Basically meaning, what 
we should do with someone when he is found insane or mentally ill. This, in my 
view, lies at the very heart of the insanity issue. I do not believe there would be 
such a furor if an insane defendant was dealt with in a manner concurrent to a 
criminal. What I mean by this is that most people view the insanity defense as a 
plea that exonerates a criminal of his crimes and sets him free. Or if they are put 
into a hospital they are inevitably let out much quicker than a person who was 
found guilty of a crime. It is interesting to note that there are criminals out on 
parole committing recurrent crimes, yet there is not a major call for the abolishment
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of the parole system. Yet when a person is released from a hospital and recommitts 
a crime, it becomes just another illustration about the faultiness of the criminal 
system.
Since this file deals with the question and problems of incarceration, it will 
also cut across the very theories regarding imprisonment and punishment. The 
questions are endless. Is it more important to rehabilitate than punish, or is 
rehabilitation just some idealistic rationalization for putting another human being 
behind bars? Does severely punishing people actually deter other people from 
committing crimes or even educate the public as to the probable results of 
committing a particular crime? Finally, how do we deal with the victims or the 
victim's families, are revenge and retribution feelings that are inhumane, or should 
they be given stronger considerations? These questions theorists have analyzed and 
argued for years. There is really no just solution for everyone. There ar? no 
significant empirical answers. Obviously, my opinions and feelings on the subject 
of punishment will strongly influence my grading of the weights and scores for this 
particular criteria. I will attempt to be as objective as possible. For if there is to be a 
solution to the problem of punishment and disposition of insanity acquittees, it 
must fall at a compromise between the polar views of rehabilitation and retribution. 
For to properly rehabilitate, the hope of freedom is necessary toachieve full 
rehabilitation. Freedom, therefore, becomes the ultimate goal. Also, a law should be 
made in regard to the present and the future and enforced accordingly. To decide 
that today we live in a, more or less, conservative country, and consequently should
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focus incarceration on longer revenge oriented terms, is not going to work, when 
the country, undoubtedly, will shift to a liberal framework. Then the question that 
will be asked is why are we not concerned with rehabilitation.
The three alternatives I will use in this file are called guilty but mentally ill, 
voluntary commitment, and involuntary commitment. I have discussed how the 
guilty but mentally ill concept is used in the state of Illinois; but this alternative is a 
slight deviation of the one previously discussed. The basic principle is the same. 
That being, a person cannot leave a hospital, even if cured, until his sentence runs 
out or would subsequently be placed on parole. The difference is that this principle 
would apply to people acquitted by the insanity defense, not just people found 
mentally ill. Whereas, before this process would not be used if you were found 
legally insane, under this alternative it would apply. To sum this up, if you were 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, you would be put in a hospitalfif the court 
feels it is necessary) and would not be able to leave the hospital until the sentence for 
the crime runs out. This would force the judge or jury to give a sentence, and for all 
practical purposes, even though the defendant was found insane, he would actually 
be treated as guilty. Thus, the only significant difference between being found 
guilty by reason of insanity, and by being found guilty in a normal proceeding is that 
the jury recommends to the judge hospitalization of the defendant. Also in this 
approach, the jurors or judge before sentencing would regard insanity as a mitigating 
circumstance in determining the length of the sentence. I should note that the state 
must keep the defendant in the hospital at least the length of the term. But it is not
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to say that if a term rum * < ul the defendant is still found to be insane, he has to
be released. As the Supre >urt ruled in U.S Vs. Jones-a defendant can be kept 
in a hospital longer than a * inparable prison term.^3 The second alternative is 
what I term voluntary commitment. By this I mean, the minute a defendant is 
labeled not guilty by insanity, it becomes a separate civil commitment proceeding. 
And then the defendant can only be committed if the state proved, through a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is presently dangerous. So this 
states that the s'.ate in a civil proceeding has to initiate civil proceedings against the 
acquittee, the person found not guilty by reason of insanity is for all intensive 
purposes a free man.
The third alternative I coin voluntary commitment. This means that the 
defendant after being found not guilty is automatically put in an institution for up to 
sixty days for psychological evaluation. Then a hearing is held in a criminal court to 
determine whether involuntary civil commitment would be appropriate. If the 
evaluation results indicate that the acquittee is not a fit subject for commitment, he 
or she is released. On the other hand, if the acquittee is found to be dangerous, then 
the court can order detainment. The three alternatives differ in a number of aspects 
that should be reviewed. First of all, voluntary commitment takes the matter of 
disposition completely out of the courts hand and into the state’s civil process, while 
involuntary and guilty but mentally ill leave the criminal courts as the sole judge of 
the disposition of the defendant. Also voluntary commitment does not force a 
psychological evaluation. Finally the guilty but mentally ill alternative will keep
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someone in the hospital or jail even if they have been proved sane and not 
dangerous.
The seven criteria or goals for this file are, more or less, straight forward. The 
first four criteria deal with theories of punishment: deterring crime, rehabilitating 
the offender, revenge for the victims, and finally protecting society. The fifth criteria 
is again the public’s perception Again there is a criterion labeled moral, however 
this differs from the previous criteria in that this reasons that it is wrong to punish 
someone who is found innocent and thereby commit him against his will, when he 
is technically a free man. The last criteria is political feasibility. This again means 
the difficulties that may be encountered with regard to constitutional objections to 
the three alternatives.
Since there are only three alternatives, I will score the criteria on a 1-3 scale 
with three being the highest or most appropriate alternative for the particular 
criteria. The first criteria deals with the question of deterrence. And while 
deterrence has been discussed endlessly, as to what extent punishment curtails 
crime, I will assume at this point that there is some effect. Clearly, of the three 
alternatives, guilty but mentally ill has the potential for the severest sentence and 
punishment, making it the strongest alternative for deterring crime. Involuntary 
commitment would thereby be a stronger option for deterring crime than its less 
restrictive counterpart.
The second criteria is the process of rehabilitating the offender, and in this 
particular paper, rehabilitation means curing the offender of any psychological
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problem. This criteria has become difficult to score. While the guilty but mentally 
ill provision will force a defendant to stay in a hospital or jail, this does not mean it 
is the most conducive alternative for rehabilitation. I am of the view that forcing 
treatment on a patient may have the reverse effect as the patient will begin to regress 
because of his punishment. However, the voluntary commitment alternative may 
let some mentally ill people slip through the system and go without treatment. 
Subsequently, the best alternative is the involuntary commitment option. Basically 
because this option forces psychological evaluation, but not automatic detainment 
and treatment.
Retribution or revenge is the third criteria and seemingly voluntary 
commitment does the least of the three alternatives to punish the offender. For 
many offenders there will not be any incarceration in a hospital or prison. 
Involuntary commitment, although stronger than voluntary, also leaves a lot to be 
desired as a credible plan for retribution. Involuntary commitment does not force 
incarceration, but simply puts the wheels in motion. There is a better chance for an 
individual to be locked up in a hospital, but it is still not certain. The final 
alternative is definitely the best in that it forces incarceration up to the sentence 
given by the jury. Protecting society is the next goal, and again the scoring runs 
along the same line as the retribution criteria. It seems perfectly reasonable to infer 
that the longer a defendant is incarcerated the greater the protection for society. To 
take this at an extreme, it seems perfectly reasonable to say that it is better to take a 
chance of incarcerating an innocent person than letting a dangerous person go free
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in this particular instance.
The next criteria deals with the public's perception of the alternatives. As I 
mentioned before, disposition is the most important aspect of the insanity plea. If 
the public is not concerned with their welfare or safety then the insanity plea will 
not be a public problem. This is not to say that it still will not be a legal or moral 
problem, but it will not be in the public's eye, as it is now. As I have previously 
discussed, the guilty but mentally ill plea would usually incarcerate a defendant for 
the greatest length of time(voluntary and involuntary are indefinite). And I believe, 
at this time, in this conservative era, the public is willing to take insane people, lock 
them up, and throw away the key. Voluntary commitment is looked at as to lax a 
solution, and is quickly disregarded by the majority of the public. What makes this 
criteria so difficult to assess is that the public's perception of an issue is constantly 
fluctuating. In the sixties and seventies, before the Hinckley debacle, voluntary 
commitment was looked at as a solid approach to the problem.^ If the public starts 
to attach more weight to liberal symbols, voluntary may become the best alternative, 
but at this time people are looking for something more severe.
The next criteria deals with the moral question of incarceration. We must 
remember that the people being committed have been found innocent of all charges. 
The guilty but mentally ill alternative leaves a lot to be desired for this particular 
goal. For one, to take a person who has been found innocent of all charges and then 
remand the individual to a hospital or prison without a hearing, has its problems. 
But Ihe biggest moral problem with this alternative is how guilty but mentally ill
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deals with the circumstances of a person being cured. If a defendant is cured, and yet 
has three years left on his sentence, he will be transferred to prison to wait out 
the remaining years of his sentence. If that is the case, why try to cure the individual 
at all? How will going to prison effect the well-being of the patient? Involuntary 
commitment has the same problem as the guilty but mentally ill alternative, and 
that being taking an innocent individual and forcing him into the custody of the 
authorities. The difference being a hospital and not a prison. Of the three options 
voluntary commitment is the strongest morally. The individual is treated as an 
innocent person and is only held in custody, if through civil proceedings, the state 
can prove his dangerousness.
The final criteria is the political feasibility of the alternatives, or how well they 
stand up to constitutional objections. At this time nineteen states use a voluntary 
commitment type of alternative and twelve states use an involuntary alternative.
The other nineteen states use a wide variety of dispositional methods. However 
classifying the states is a bit of an overgeneralization, since each state has different 
variations, these include: different lengths of initial commitment, different 
provisions for conditional release, different allocations of responsibility for release 
decisions etc..6  ^ But the bottom line is that these two alternatives are being practiced 
in one form or another in the majority of states. The Jones Vs. U.S. case seems to 
signal a trend toward the restrictive end or toward an involuntary alternative.66 
Also by keeping the decision of disposition at the criminal level, the involuntary 
alternative has bypassed numerous constitutional objections dealing with unfair
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civil commitment processes, as spelled out in the case of Addington Vs. 
Texas(1979).6 '  The guilty but mentally ill alternative is a different question. Since 
there is no such form on the books, there has not been any constitutional test. The 
best that can be done is to infer from cases dealing with the actual guilty but mentally 
ill provision. At this time the guilty but mentally ill provision has been attacked on 
equal protection and due process grounds, most notably in Illinois and Michigan. 
People Vs. Mdeod(1980) was a Michigan case that upheld the constitutionality of the 
guilty but mentally ill plea on both equal protection and due process grounds."® In 
Illinois, People Vs. Kaeding(1983) and People Vs. Dewitt(1984) upheld the provision 
on the same questions.®® The question that has not been answered by the courts is 
whether the provision will be upheld under a fundamental fairness principle. The 
rationale being that there is confusion for the jurors in deciding between the not 
guilty by reason of Insanity plea and the guilty but mentally ill plea/® These cases 
seem to imply that the guilty but mentally ill alternative that I have forwarded 
would have significant problems in dealing with constitutional questions and, even 
more importantly, having difficulty in getting the disposition system completely 
overhauled.
DEIEE REHAB RETRIB PUB. S PUB. P MORAL F EAS.G
GMI 3 2 3 3 3 1 1
INVOL 2 3 2 2 2 2 3
40
VOL 1 1 1 1 1 3  2
PRIMARY ANALYSIS
GMI 16
IN VOL 16
VOL 10
As before, I feel that giving each criteria the same weight does not really tell 
the whole story. Since there are seven criteria, the weights are scored on a 1-7 scale. 
Whereas before, in the definition file, the emphasis was on responsibility and 
innocence, I feel the emphasis on the disposition file should be punishment. In my 
mind, even though an individual has been found innocent, a crime has been 
committed. Because of this, I feel protecting society is imperative in dealing with 
someone who has already committed a crime. If there is not any recurrent crimes, 
then there most likely will not be a problem with the plea itself. Along those same 
lines, retribution is another very important criteria. Although the defendants did 
not "know" what they were doing, I feei some punishment must still be involved. 
Victims are too easily forgotten, and often a revenge or retribution factor is needed 
to ease the psychological pain for the victim or for the victim's family. It just does 
not seem right for a person to commit a crime and then not pay.
On the other end of the spectrum is the moral dilemma posed by the insanity 
plea. Car: we morally take someone who is not responsible for their actions and 
subsequently punish the acquittee. I feel it must be done. While it might not be
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morally acceptable, it is a realistic necessity to keep people from using the plea for 
their own immoral ends. Also, it is needed to keep the public 6uie from lunatics 
who keep getting thrown back into society. Therefore, I will score the retribution 
goal higher than the moral goal.
The question of whether punishing an insane person deters others from 
committing a crime is difficult to answer. As in capital punishment, people argue 
endlessly on the effects of punishment. On the one end are the opponents of 
deterrence, who feel that if a person is truly insane then someone else being 
punished is of no way going to effect or deter the future act. People who plead 
insanity are delusional, not people who are going to look at a cost-benefit ratio. On 
the other side are the proponents of deterrence, who claim that we are not just a 
product of our hereditary, but more importantly our environment. And if we can 
teach people that there are no excuses when it comes to crimes, and punishment is 
inevitable, then it may be able to deter. Regardless of which, deterrence is an issue 
that can not be answered, and consequently, I will attach to it an average weight.
In the definition file ,! felt that the public perception criteria was not an 
important criteria, in this circumstance I feel it has a bit more relevance. The 
alternative that is chosen has a direct bearing on the public at-large. The plea, itself, 
is in danger every time some murderer is found innocent by reason of insanity and 
subsequently is let out from a state hospital a few months later. If he kills, there 
becomes a public backlash(Hinckley) and the call for abolishing the plea rings 
through the air. Again, the political feasibility criteria is not terribly important.
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None of the alternatives have been shown to be unconstitutional, and even if it 
were true that an alternative was to be found unconstitutional on some ground, it 
does not seem to difficult to revise the law. That, of course, does not mean amend 
the constitution, but instead tinker with the alternative.
I wrestled with the last criteria of rehabilitation. At first, I felt it was a very 
important goal because, perhaps, the most important goal in our penal system is to 
attempt to rehabilitate offenders. But when looking at the alternatives a little closer, 
it seemed to me that each alternative had basically the same ideals for rehabilitation. 
Each of the alternatives had a patient staying in the hospital until they were 
sufficiently cured. The difference in the alternatives is how the patients get to the 
hospital and where they are transferred after they have been cured. With that in 
mind, while rehabilitation is very important, the criteria is not. Thus, I changed the 
weights to:
PUB. SAF=7 PUB.PER=3
RETR1B.=6 POL.FEAS=2
MORAL=5 REHAB.=1
DETER. =4
With the new weights, the primary analysis looks like this:
GM I69 
INVOL 59 
VOL 40
So at this point the guilty but mentally ill alternative is the strongest. A look
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at the threshold analysis will tell why it is the strongest and if it is feasible for the 
voluntary or involuntary alternative to move ahead. The voluntary threshold 
analysis looks like this:
GMI VOLUNTARY WEIGHT
DETER. -3.75 7.75 -9.5
REHAB. -25.0 28.0 -26.0
RETRIB. -1.5 5.5 -7.5
PUB.SAF. -.86 4.86 -6.5
PUB.PER. -6.0 10.0 -10.5
MORAL -4.4 8.4 18.5
POL.FEAS. -12.5 16.5 15.5
As with the previous file, the first thing to look at are the weights, in this file 
the weights run from a 1-7 scale, and therefore any weight outside of that range does 
not make any sense to radically change. Also the scoring was on a 1-3 scale, so any 
scores out of that range are also not feasible to look at carefully. Looking at the 
analysis, there is not one category that falls in either range; basically stating that the 
voluntary alternative would have to undergo radical scoring changes to defeat the 
guilty but mentally ill alternative.
The other analysis is between the guilty but mentally ill provision and the 
involuntary alternative.
GMI INVOLUNTARY WEIGHT
DETER. 0 5.0 -8.0
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REHAB. -10.0 15.0 13.0
RETR1B. 1.0 4.0 -6.0
PUB.SAF. 1.29 3.71 -5.0
PUB.PER - 1.0 6.0 -9.0
MORAL -1.4 4.4 17
POL.FEAS. -5.0 8.0 14
This analysis, while closer than the previous analysis, still shows that the guilty but 
mentally ill provision is far and wide the strongest. The two categories that do have 
numbers falling in the proper range are retribution and public safety. The guilty but 
mentally ill alternative scored a three on both of those categories; and for the 
involuntary alternative to become a winner, the score for guilty but mentally ill has 
to be one. The strongest feature of the guilty but mentally ill alternative, however, is 
that it will not release an offender until his sentence has ended. There can be no 
chance of an individual leaving a hospital early. And although it can be argued that 
the involuntary and voluntary alternative commitments are indefinite, there still is 
the problem of getting and keeping patients in the hospital for those two 
alternatives. Also, to say that the guilty but mentally ill alternative would be the 
worst solution for these goals, is ridiculous to assume.
Looking back at this file, it becomes apparent that the emphasis was on punishment. 
However, if a criteria was added that took into account stability for a law, the winner 
would not be so clear cut. As I mentioned, I fall into the period of conservative 
feelings toward criminals. This can be seen in my weighting of the public safety and
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retribution goals Yet an alternative is needed that would be accepted during the 
liberal years when individual’s rights and rehabilitation are looked at with stronger 
regard. If this stability criteria was added, the involuntary alternative would become 
much stronger and challenge the guilty but mentally ill alternative. A compromise 
seems to be necessary, and for that I will turn my attention to the burden of proof 
controversy.
Jurors on the Hinckley trial felt that it was virtually impossible for the state to reach 
the burden of proof in regard to sanity. They felt, and wanted, the burden to be 
placed on the defense for justice to be properly served.^ With that in mind, I first 
felt another file would be necessary to determine the choices of whether prosecution 
or defense should be entrusted with the burden of a reasonable doubt at the trial 
stage, and a preponderance of the evidence at the dispositional and release stage. But 
the solution seems to center on a clear-cut choice. Is it more important to be ’fair'' to 
the defendant or to the public? In almost every instance, 1 will argue vehemently 
that a man is innocent until proven guilty, and it is always the state that has the 
burden of proving guilt. But in this instance, the defendant is the one who usually 
initiates the plea. In Walen Vs. Malcom, the court held that the law presumes a 
defendant to be sane7^ It is almost as if the supposed criminal is trying to bypass the 
normal proceedings and use another route. Hence, if a defendant wants to get out of 
the normal criminal proceeding, I feel he should bear the risk and the burden of 
proving his insanity. In the commitment and the release stage, a preponderance of 
the evidence is necessary, and again I feel that since it was the defendant's choice to
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take the insanity route, he should have the burden squarely on his shoulders. 
Simply, the state is letting someone who has committed a crime forego jail or 
punitive punishment for a strictly rehabilitating onefexcluding GMI). The 
defendant, not the state, has asked to be placed in the hospital; and it would seem 
that the patient should have to prove to the state that he is not dangerous before he 
can be let out. In short, the state always has the burden of proof because of the 
innocent until proven guilty doctrine. But in the case of the insanity plea, this 
doctrine has been reversed. The defendant admits guilt, and thus it becomes his 
duty to prove his innocence or non*dangerousness.
In conclusion, changing existing laws is a sometime difficult and perplexing task. 
But the insanity plea is a doctrine that needs tinkering with, as the dicta in Powell 
Vs. Texas states, "we characterize the (insanity) defense as one of those doctrines 
which have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of 
the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, 
moral,philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man-a process always 
thought to be a province of the state."^ We have seen through the policy 
evaluation program that some tinkering is necessary to update the insanit plea 
with our conservative oriented society. There are many different viewpoints on the 
matter of the insanity plea and even though my alternatives in the files did not 
come close to covering every option, Ifelt it did give a rough estimate as to the 
different approaches that are involved. The results of the program indicates to me 
that the ALI standard is sufficient to define insanity. But I feel we must place the
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burden of proof on the defendant who is claiming insanity, instead of the state, if 
the defendant is found insane, he should serve a mandatory 30 day sentence for the 
purpose of psychological evaluation. These results will then be used in a criminal 
proceeding to determine the state of health of the individual. Again the burden is 
on the defendant to show through a preponderance of the evidence that he is not 
dangerous to the public. If he is found dangerous, the individual will undergo 
psychological treatment until he can show in a criminal hearing that he is not a 
threat to society; again placing the burden on the defendant. This rough plan is, for 
the most part, being used in a minority of the states today. While the different 
specifics of the process should be left up to each state, the basic option that I have 
forwarded keeps the insanity plea as a viable option. But more importantly this 
option is better able to protect society, literally the best of both worlds.
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